By: Damir Akhoundov

Note: Data contained in this report is comprised of ERAI alerts issued against organizations from January 2007 through mid-December 2017.

As an industry reporting agency, ERAI collects and distributes data on high risk and suspect counterfeit parts and also on high risk suppliers, financially unstable organizations and criminal activity. Membership in ERAI is not required to file a complaint nor does ERAI collect a fee when assisting non-member organizations. Information provided to ERAI is held in the strictest confidence and the reporting organization’s identity is not released to parties not directly related to the incident. Once a complaint has been filed, adequate documentation to substantiate a complaint has been provided, all organizations have had a chance to respond and dispute the complaint and ERAI’s review process is complete, an ERAI alert is issued to our membership base.

From 2007 through 2017, ERAI has issued alerts against approximately 3,300 separate organizations for issues ranging from past due invoices to supplying nonconforming product.

Geographic Distribution of Reporting Organizations

The majority of complaints originate from domestic, US-based organizations, possibly due in part to government regulations and industry standard requirements. Globally, ERAI has investigated incidents filed by organizations from 35 countries around the world.



Geographic Distribution of Reported Organizations

In looking at the geographic location of reported organizations (those against which complaints were filed), again, the majority were located in the USA (60.2%), followed by China at 18.4%. The balance of reported organizations was located in 55 other countries.



Incident Types

When looking at the types of incidents reported to ERAI during this time period, we see that although the majority of complaints filed were financial in nature (45.76% were complaints related to past due invoices alone), nearly a quarter of complaints were related to nonconforming electronic parts, of which 16.61% specifically involved suspect counterfeit parts.



Suspect Counterfeit Parts Reporting

When looking specifically at organizations who file complaints for suspect counterfeit parts, we see that just under 25% of reports originate from non-US based organizations, underscoring the importance of international cooperation to ensure the safety of the global electronics supply chain.



Predictably, when assessing the geographic distribution of companies against which ERAI alerts were issued for suspect counterfeit parts, just under 40% were located in China. However, a notable 33.1% of organizations reported for supplying suspect counterfeit parts were located in the United States, once again stressing the importance of strong supplier verification processes, even for domestic suppliers. While this data does not provide us with the knowledge of where the suspect counterfeit parts originated, it is clear that having a policy of not sourcing parts from China is an insufficient purchasing policy in the mitigation of suspect counterfeit parts.



Repeat Offenders

Lastly, we took a look at how often the same organizations were reported to ERAI since 2007. The results indicated that 74.7% of the organizations reported by ERAI have been reported only once, while 25.3% have been reported two or more times. A total of 16 organizations have been reported 10 or more times.



Reminder to our Members: The company search tool in the ERAI website is an invaluable tool to mitigate risk posed by organizations engaging in unscrupulous business practices. Be sure to incorporate checks of the ERAI database prior to conducting business with any company you are not familiar with. It is also imperative to ensure that reporting of problematic parts, suppliers and customers to ERAI is part of your organization’s routine process.

Not currently an ERAI Member? To learn how your organization can benefit from access to ERAI’s data, please visit http://www.erai.com/join_ERAI.

All organizations regardless of membership status: To engage ERAI’s assistance with a problematic organization or to learn more about ERAI’s complaints process, please visit http://www.erai.com/information_sharing_file_complaint or call our office at +1-239-261-6268.

By: Mark Snider & Anne-Liese Heinichen

Let’s start with the definition of a cloned part. SAE Aerospace Standard AS6171 Test Methods Standard; General Requirements, Suspect/Counterfeit, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts defines cloned parts as one of seven counterfeit part types:

A reproduction of a part produced by an unauthorized manufacturer without approval or design authority that replicates the authorized manufacturer’s part. NOTE: Cloning eliminates the large development cost of a part. Cloning can be done in two ways: by reverse engineering or by obtaining design information and/or technical data inappropriately (such as by unauthorized knowledge transfer from a person with access to the part design).ⁱ

A recent Circuits Assembly article proposed that these dangerous counterfeits have already infiltrated the market and are not just posing a threat to product performance, but to cybersecurity as well.ⁱⁱ The obvious difficulty with clones is determining a product’s authenticity. Given that most currently-available means of counterfeit detection are cost-prohibitive on a large scale and lack industry-wide support and that support from original component manufacturers in determining a product’s authenticity is limited, do reverse-engineered counterfeit clone parts exist?

A recent alert issued by ERAI for an Altera part that had undergone testing in a laboratory cited the following as indicators that the parts were “clone material”:

• Inconsistent font and grammar on all labels which had appeared to be tampered with.
• Inconsistent part markings when compared to a known good device.
• Inconsistent pin-one indicator cavities which varied in depth.
• Solvent tests did not present signs to indicate the parts were not authentic.
• A scrape test concluded no resurfacing material was present.
• Radiological inspection revealed the lead frame, die size and placement and bond wire gauge and routing were inconsistent from the known good device.
• XRF analysis found the leads contained Sn and Cu which did not match the factory label denoting RoHS compliancy code “e4” and varied from those found in the known good devices.
• Decapsulation revealed the die layout was consistent between the samples but differed “significantly” from the known good devices.
• SEM did not uncover any signs to indicate the components were not authentic.
• The parts passed blank check.

We spoke to a few members to get their input about clones. Some individuals we spoke to believe that too much financial outlay and time commitment would be required for someone to justify the creation of a reverse-engineering process. Others have also stated that the existence of clones is uncertain as they believe that manufacturers do not disclose enough information, particularly when a manufacturer acquires the assets of another manufacturer providing limited or inadequate data via product change notices. Most individuals employed in the distribution side concur that, without more assistance and input from manufacturers, a product’s authenticity cannot be determined, thus, it is difficult to ascertain conclusively if cloned parts exist. Whether or not clones as defined in AS6171 are real or not may be an ongoing topic of debate. What we do know is the industry is starting to see a much higher quality counterfeiting process. So, are we seeing cloned devices or just highly sophisticated counterfeits? Again, difficult to answer with any certainty without cooperation from the manufacturers, who may be unwilling to even comment on the subject for a multitude of reasons.

In the end, clone or high quality counterfeit may be somewhat irrelevant to your organization depending on your business model. Keep in mind, when we address counterfeits there are primarily two distinctly different sets of stakeholders. The factories and authorized resellers that make their money from the initial sale after fabrication and the integrators and manufacturers that use integrated circuits bundled together with other items to create finished products which, in turn, are generally sold for profit. With this in mind, the two groups may look at the same problem entirely differently. For the IP owner, clones could pose a significant financial threat to their business. For the industrial manufacturing world, the primary concern may be quality, not just initially, but over time. For those of you whose mission or job is to keep counterfeits out of your supply chain, the terminology may be somewhat irrelevant. After all, if the existence of cloning is eventually acknowledged by the IP holders, in the end, cloning is just another form of counterfeiting, albeit much harder to detect than refurbished e-waste.

In closing, what we do know is there is evidence to show that, as expected, counterfeiting processes are evolving and improving, often making them more difficult to detect. With that said, collaboration and data sharing can go a long way in helping to keep the industry informed as new counterfeiting processes evolve.

Share your thoughts with us. Have you encountered a clone? Email us at mark.snider@erai.com and anne@erai.com.

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ⁱ Fama, Joseph. “Attack of the Clones.” Circuit Assembly Online Magazine, 6 Nov. 2017, www.circuitsassembly.com/ca/editorial/menu-features/28360-attack-of-the-clones-2.html.
ⁱⁱ Aerospace Standard AS6171, Test Methods Standard; General Requirements, Suspect/Counterfeit, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts. SAE International, Oct. 2016

Verifying an individual’s training history with InterCEPT is quick and easy – all you need is the certificate identification number located on the bottom right corner of the certificate issued to any individual.

Verification feature is available to anyone; you do not need to enroll in InterCEPT or ERAI to verify an InterCEPT certificate of training. Under the Training tab at www.counterfeittraining.com, select the Certificate Verification tab.



Enter the certificate identification number in the field and click the Verify Certificate button to complete the verification.



As always, if you would prefer to speak to a staff member, please contact us at +1-239-261-6268 for direct assistance.

By: Anne-Liese Heinichen

On October 2, 2017, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) released its latest update of the Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR) Guidebook. The CPSR Guidebook, “provides guidance and procedures to Government personnel for evaluating contractor’s purchasing systems and preparing the CPSR reports”. While a CPSR is only performed on contractors whose annual sales to the government exceed $50 million dollars a year (excluding competitively awarded firm-fixed-price contracts, competitively awarded fixed-price with economic price adjustment contracts, and FAR part 12 acquisition of commercial items), the review criteria and applicable FAR and DFARS requirements may be flowed down to subcontractors, affecting smaller defense-oriented suppliers.

At the core, the CPSR evaluates a contractor’s purchasing systems to ensure compliance with 24 elements per DFARS 252.244-7001 (c). Among the elements are: ensuring that all applicable POs and subcontracts contain all flow down clauses, including those required by the FAR and DFARS including DFARS 252.246.7007 Contractor Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance; a structure that ensures effective procurement of quality materials and parts; establishing and maintaining selection processes to promote competitive sourcing among dependable suppliers; and procedures to ensure proper types of subcontracts are selected along with controls over subcontracting including oversight and surveillance of subcontracted effort.ⁱ The elements standardize and show how DCMA ensures compliance with DoD purchasing requirements and how DCMA expects its contractors to effectively manage subcontracts to ensure performance to government regulations and internal policies.

Ultimately it is the decision of the administrative contracting offer whether to grant, withhold or withdraw approval of the contractor’s purchasing system. Appropriate follow-up review procedures are defined to permit a contractor to perform any necessary corrective actions in the event of a disapproval.

The Guidebook also contains 30 appendices, each covering topics and relevant regulations that DCMA reviews during a CPSR. Of note, this October 2017 revision features revisions to Appendix 10 – Counterfeit Parts Mitigation and Surveillance. In addition to reviewing purchasing systems, DCMA Quality Assurance reviews contactors’ counterfeit detection and avoidance systems. Per DFARS 252.244-7001 (c) (19), (20) and (21), this may include small businesses and non-CAS covered contractors. Furthermore, the CPSR Procurement Analyst should determine if DFARS 252.246-7007 and/or 252.246-7008 are incorporated into the prime contracts. Additional changes include domestic preference requirements through the Buy American and Berry Amendment regulations.

ERAI recommends that government prime contractors and their subcontractors review the changes to the CPSR and consult within their organization to assess if their purchasing systems are ready for DCMA review.

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ⁱ Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR) Guidebook. 2 Oct. 2017, www.dcma.mil/Portals/31/Documents/CPSR/CPSR_Guidebook_100217.pdf.

By: Anne-Liese Heinichen

In March 2011, the Fukushima disaster resulted in global supply disruptions of silicon wafers, automotive parts and other electronic assemblies. In February 2015, a structural fire destroyed the main plant at a GE Aviation facility located in Dowty in the UK. The facility was the sole manufacturer of propellers for Lockheed Martin’s C-130J aircraft.ⁱ While we have all heard the saying “don’t put all of your eggs in one basket”, has your organization identified, documented, analyzed and prepared for a supply interruption, especially for parts from a single source of supply?

This question was also at the heart of a recently released Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled, “Defense Supply Chain – DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks”. The GAO examined DOD’s report per Senate Report 114-49 which instructed DOD to provide a report which, “identifies major defense acquisition programs with operational implications, a list of critical components of such major defense acquisition programs provided by single-source and/or single-provider suppliers, the severity of the operational impact of the loss of such suppliers, and risk management actions with associated implementation plans and timelines the Department will take to prevent negative operational impact in the event of such loss.”ⁱⁱ The GAO report found that the DOD’s October 2016 report addressed two of four elements required by the Senate, partially addressed one element and did not address a fourth element. While much of the detail is specific to the Department of Defense, the report contains takeaways relevant to any organization:

• An organization should recognize potential supply chain risks, including single source suppliers. These risks should be identified, monitored and assessed and supply chain risk management strategies should be employed.
• Organizations should identify plans and timelines for risk mitigation actions.
• Along with analyzing suppliers, your organization’s risk mitigation analysis should include what the GAO report called “organic facilities” or facilities/locations internal to your organization such as maintenance, repair or storage facilities.
• Organizations should employ the use of risk management or advisory boards to routinely review risks, mitigation plans and resources.
• Ensure that identified risks and plans are shared throughout your organization. All relevant departments and facilities should be aware of product availability, obsolescence and other factors as early as possible. Data and information-sharing systems play a large role in supply chain management.
• Your organization should not rely solely or primarily on contractors to identify potential risks. Most organizations will not have a way to validate that contractors are sharing critical information and may not themselves be fully aware of risks in sub-tiers of contracts.
• Implement proactive DMSMS management to mitigate risks, avoid costs and prevent schedule delays. It is estimated in the report that 98% of missile and munitions suppliers are single sources of supply where it may not be possible to find replacements or alternatives may be very costly. Ensure that your organization plans and budgets for obsolescence.

While DOD officials stated it would not be feasible to develop risk mitigation strategies for every supplier, they did acknowledge that doing so for critical suppliers would be appropriate.ⁱⁱⁱ Each organization should ensure that effective processes are in place to account for supply chain disruptions. While commercial organizations may not be as seemingly adversely affected by a disruption such as in the mil-aero and defense communities, supply chain interruptions can substantively impact any organizations’ finances, damage a brand’s reputation and negatively affect business continuity.

The GAO report can be viewed online at:
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-768

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ⁱ Norris, Guy. GE Dowty Assessing Fire Impact On C-130J, Q400 Programs. Aviation Week Network, 6 Feb. 2015, aviationweek.com/advanced-machines-aerospace-manufacturing/ge-dowty-assessing-fire-impact-c-130j-q400-programs.
ⁱⁱ United States, Congress, “S. Rept. 114-49 - NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 REPORT.” S. Rept. 114-49 - NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 REPORT, 19 May 2015. www.congress.gov/congressional-report/114th-congress/senate-report/49/1.
ⁱⁱⁱ U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Defense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks.” U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO), 28 Sept. 2017, www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-768.

By: Anne-Liese Heinichen

On November 30, 2017, prosecutors in the Northern District of California filed an indictment against four former employees of Applied Materials, Inc. for allegedly conspiring to commit theft of trade secrets and possession of stolen trade secrets, aiding and abetting. Liang Chen, Donald Olgado, Wei-Yung Hsu and Robert Ewald are accused of downloading more than 16,000 CAD drawings, bills of materials, chemical recipes, prototypes, client data, and marketing materials and plans related to high volume manufacturing of semiconductor wafers for use in LEDs in lighting and electronic applications. The materiel, all considered Applied Materials’ proprietary trade secrets, was stolen during the time the four defendants were employed by Applied.

By communicating through personal emails, the defendants planned the formation of a new company to be called “Envision” through which they would replicate Applied’s technology for their own benefit and presumed financial gain. The indictment also alleged that, “from approximately October 1, 2012 through November 2012, Chen attempted to recruit investors in order to fund Envision in the United States and the People’s Republic of China.”ⁱ Unfortunately, no details were provided in the indictment detailing the identity of the Chinese investors nor the amount of money the defendants sought. The defendants each face sentences of up to 10 years in prison for each count along with a fine of $250,000.00.

As we reported last year, China’s national policy pushes towards self-reliance and strengthening of domestic production capabilities, especially in the semiconductor arena. A January 2017 report by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) found that the industry faces major challenges in light of China’s “concerted push…to reshape the market to favor their needs”.ⁱⁱ The report continued that innovation was necessary as, “only by continuing to innovate at the cutting edge will the United States be able to mitigate the threat posed by Chinese industrial policy and strengthen the U.S. economy.”ⁱⁱⁱ According to the report, China employs ‘zero-sum tactics’ which raise (and not lower) costs such as forcing or encouraging Chinese companies to purchase solely from the domestic semiconductor market, transfer of technology in exchange for access to the Chinese market, covert and overt theft of intellectual property, and collusion to devalue takeover targets to purchase them at a lower cost.^iv Intellectual property theft allows Chinese corporations to develop new products and enhance their infrastructure without the significant outlay of capital and time already invested by American companies.

In response to Chinese activities, the report provided recommendations on investment restrictions, enforcement of export controls and continued government measures focused on national security. Along with government-centered responses, the report stressed the importance of cooperation between federal, state, and local agencies, industry and academia.

As technology advances, it becomes easier for bad actors to infiltrate, access and steal intellectual property. Every organization should ensure that cybersecurity is prioritized and clear policies and procedures are defined including controlled access, monitoring, encryption, proper storage, handling and disposition of data, employee training and regular audits.

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ⁱ United States District Court, Northern District of California, San Jose Division. The United States of America vs. Liang Chen, Donald Olgado, Wei-Yung Hsu, and Robert Ewald. 20 Nov. 2017. PACER.
ⁱⁱ Mundie, Craig, and Paul Otellini. “Ensuring U.S. Leadership and Innovation in Semiconductors.” The White House - President Barack Obama, 9 Jan. 2017, 12:04, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2017/01/09/ensuring-us-leadership-and-innovation-semiconductors.
ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid
^iv President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. “REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT Ensuring Long - Term U.S. Leadership in Semiconductors.” The White House - President Barack Obama, Jan. 2017, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_ensuring_long-term_us_leadership_in_semiconductors.pdf.

By: Anne-Liese Heinichen

In October of 2016, Ali Caby, Arash Caby and Marjan Caby were charged with exporting prohibited articles to Syria.  Through their Miami-based company, AW-Tronics, LLC, the defendants allegedly devised a scheme to export dual-use goods with both civilian and military applications by listing the destination of the products as “USA” while then exporting the devices to their Bulgaria office where they were forwarded to Syrian Arab Airlines, a government-run airline allegedly transporting weapons and ammunition to Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

On December 19, 2017, Ali Caby aka “Axel Caby”, who pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate IEEPA and defraud the United States, was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment, a $100.00 assessment fee, and ordered to surrender to U.S. Customs and Immigration after imprisonment for removal proceedings. Ali Caby will not permitted to re-enter the United States without prior permission and if permitted, will be subject to 2 years of supervised release with special conditions. The defendant also agreed to forfeit any claims against the $17,500.00 forfeited by the government.

Arash Caby also pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the IEEPA and was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment, a $10,100.00 assessment and fine and 2 years of supervised release during which the defendant shall provide complete access to financial information to a U.S. Probation Officer, must consent to personal and property searches, is not permitted to incur further debts (including loans), must obtain prior written approval before entering into any self-employment and must participate in substance abuse treatment.

For the same count, Marjan Caby was sentenced to one year and one day imprisonment, a $100.00 assessment fee and 2 years of supervised release with financial disclosure requirements, no new debt restriction, self-employment restriction and substance abuse treatment requirements.

Additional Reading:
Ali Caby Judgment
Arash Caby Judgment
Marjan Caby Judgment

The Global E-Waste Monitor 2017 Why you should read it: This report, a collaboration between the United Nations University’s Sustainable Cycles (SCYCLE) program, The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Solid Waste Association (ISWA), provides updates on the world-wide increasing levels of electronic waste and its improper disposal. ERAI Insight: Thanks to urbanization and technological advances, more of us are using and thus disposing of electronic equipment. According to this report, most of the 44.7 million metric tons of e-waste is not being documented or appropriately recycled, the majority of which is either incinerated or winds up in landfills. Only an approximate 20% or waste is properly recycled. Most of the waste is generated in Asia, the least in Africa. From a country standpoint, only 41 countries have official e-waste statistics. With regard to legislation, 66% of nations have adopted e-waste legislation, an increase from 44% in 3 years. The report summarizes that standardization is needed to truly assess the size of the problem, as variations occur with regard to the type of e-waste that is covered by legislation and statistical data gaps. However, statistics indicate that the total value of raw materials present in e-waste is approximately 55 billion Euros, an amount greater than the 2016 gross domestic product of most countries in the world. Circular economy models should be adopted to close the loop of materials through better design and management of waste through legislation. Click here to read the report Learn more: National Geographic posted an article on December 13, 2017 entitled "Each U.S. Family Trashes 400 iPhones' Worth of E-Waste a Year”. Author Stephanie Leahy discusses the report findings and shows how countries around the world fail to recycle the ever-growing stream of e-waste. Read the article at: https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/e-waste-monitor-report-glut/

Supply Chain Risks Worry OEMs Most: Here are the Top 20
https://epsnews.com/2017/10/16/supply-chain-risks-worry-oems/

Growing threat: Cyber and nuclear weapons systems
https://thebulletin.org/growing-threat-cyber-and-nuclear-weapons-systems11201

Bill Would Require DoD to Contract with Online Marketplaces for COTS Parts
http://www.sourcetoday.com/latest-news/bill-would-require-dod-contract-online-marketplaces-cots-parts?NL=ESB-001&Issue=ESB-001_20170829_ESB-001_637&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1

IPC Releases G Revisions of IPC-A-610 and IPC J-STD-001
http://milaero.iconnect007.com/index.php/article/107333/ipc-releases-g-revisions-of-ipc-a-610-and-ipc-j-std-001/107336/?skin=milaero

New tricks needed to stop the €45 billion counterfeit smartphone market
https://www.vanillaplus.com/2017/11/08/32345-new-tricks-needed-stop-e45-billion-counterfeit-smartphone-market/

Attack of the Clones
http://www.circuitsassembly.com/ca/editorial/menu-features/28360-attack-of-the-clones-2.html

As security becomes an important part of the design process, what are the issues?
http://www.newelectronics.co.uk/electronics-technology/as-security-becomes-an-important-part-of-the-design-process-what-are-the-issues/164825/

Block Party: How Manufacturers Can Harness the Power of Blockchain to Enhance Supply Chain Management
https://www.ebnonline.com/author.asp?section_id=4032&doc_id=283107

Just Like Being There: Productronica 2017 & Combatting Counterfeiters
https://www.ebnonline.com/author.asp?section_id=3894&doc_id=283138

Chinese Regime Laying Siege to U.S. Semiconductor Industry
https://www.theepochtimes.com/chinese-regime-laying-siege-to-u-s-semiconductor-industry_2387135.html

United Technologies resolves U.S. counterfeit parts probe for $1 million
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-utc-settlement/united-technologies-resolves-u-s-counterfeit-parts-probe-for-1-million-idUSKBN1ED292

A supply chain is a network between a company and its suppliers to produce and distribute a specific product. In the electronics industry, the supply chain represents the steps it takes to get the product from the original manufacturer to the customer. Supply chain activities include production, distribution, logistics and sourcing. Companies in a supply chain are often referred to as tiers. In this class we will examine the various tiers that make up the global semiconductor supply chain. From organizations who manufacture components (OCMs and Aftermarket Manufacturers), to authorized distributors and independent distribution, electronic parts can change hands several times, increasing the risk of encountering a counterfeit part.

This class will:

• Explain the vital role each tier plays.
• Demonstrate the movement of parts through the use of real-world scenarios.
• Identify vulnerabilities that may contribute to the introduction of a counterfeit part, which has the potential to seriously compromise the safety and operational effectiveness of products.

The course covers:

• Definition of the tiers of suppliers in the electronic supply chain (OCM, AD, ID, Broker)
• Electronics supply chain statistics from the Bureau of Industry and Security study
• Risk levels associated with each tier
• Definition of the tiers of customers in the electronic supply chain (OEM, CM)
• Supply chain transactions and their vulnerabilities

Students completing the class will be able to:

• Understand the vital role of each tier of the electronic supply chain.
• Distinguish the risk levels associated with different tiers of the supply chain.
• Identify vulnerabilities that may contribute to the introduction of a counterfeit part.

This class will be added shortly to InterCEPT’s class offerings addressing the issue of counterfeit electronic components from a high level perspective.