DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

AMERICA'S COMBAT LOGISTICS SUPPORT AGENCY











Combating Counterfeiting Program

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Defense Logistics Agency

America's Combat Logistics Support Agency

- 25,232 Civilians, 583 Active Duty Military, 752 Reservists
- Located in 48 States/28 Countries

Global Support To Warfighters by:

- Processed an average of 102,327 orders per day in the past 12 months
- Producing an average of 9,221 contract lines awarded per day
- Staffing 26 Distribution Centers Worldwide
- Processed 17.6M Receipts and Issues during the past 12 months
- Managing nearly 5.2M items through Nine supply chains
- Supporting more than 2,283Weapon Systems
- Providing over 87.73% of Services' repair parts
- Providing nearly 100% of Services' subsistence, fuels, medical, clothing & textiles, construction & barrier material



Full Spectrum Global Support

Supply Chains

- Land Systems
- Maritime Systems
- Aviation Systems
- Fuel/Energy
- Industrial Hardware
- Subsistence
- Medical
- Clothing & Textile
- Construction & Equip



Distribution

- 26 Distribution Centers
- \$98B DoD Inventory
- 52M sq ft covered storage





Disposition Services

- Co-located with customers
- Over \$25B per year
- Reutilization & Marketing
- Reverse Logistics

Theater Support

USPACOM

- DLA Europe & Africa
- DLA Pacific
- DLA Central



USEUCOM

Services

- DLA Document Services
- DLA Logistics Information Services
- DLA Transaction Services

Strategic Materials

 Critical items such as titanium, cobalt, and tungsten



Global Supply Chains

Troop Support - Philadelphia

- CLI: Subsistence
 - Food Service
 - Produce
 - Operational Rations
- CLII: Clothing & Textile
 - Recruit Clothing
 - Organizational Clothing & Individual Equipment
- CLIV/VII: Construction & Equipment
 - Facilities Maintenance
 - Equipment
 - Wood Products
 - Safety & Rescue Equipment
- CLVIII: Medical
 - Pharmaceutical
 - Medical/Surgical Equipment
- CLIX: Industrial Hardware
 - Major Weapon Systems Consumable Repair Parts



Aviation - Richmond

- CLIX:
 - Engine Components, Air Frames
 - Flight Safety Equipment, Maps
 - Environmental Products

Land and Maritime - Columbus

- CLIX: Maritime
 - Valves, Fluid Handling
 - Electrical/Electronics
 - Motors, Packing/Gaskets
- CLIX: Land
 - Wheeled, Tracked & Heavy Vehicle Parts
 - Vehicle Maintenance Kits
 - Power Transmission/Engine/Suspension Components
 - Tires, Batteries and Small Arms Parts

Energy - Fort Belvoir

- CLIII: Energy
 - DoD Executive Agent for all Bulk Petroleum
 - Natural Gas, Coal, Electricity
 - Aerospace Energy

Counterfeiting: A Growing Threat to DOD

- A growing risk to mission readiness, personnel safety and national security
- Globalization has created vulnerabilities in DOD's supply chain
- Counterfeits are in DOD's supply chain
- China is the main source of counterfeits
- High incidence rate with electronic parts
- Legislation requires contractors & DOD to reduce the risk of counterfeit electronic parts from entering into DOD's supply chain



Key Guidance for Combating Counterfeiting

- 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (Section 818)
 - Requires DoD to implement risk based approach that minimizes impact of counterfeit/suspected counterfeit electronic parts
 - Directs revision of DFARS to address detection & elimination of counterfeit parts by contractors
- 16 March 2012 AT&L Memorandum on DoD Counterfeit Prevention
 - Directed immediate action to decreased counterfeit parts in DoD's supply chain
- DoDI 5200.44 "Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks"
- DoDI 4140.hh "Counterfeit Prevention Policy" (Expected Release Jan 13)
- 2012 DLA Director's Guidance on Counterfeit Prevention



Combating Counterfeiting

- Component cost is not correlated to its criticality
- Criticality analysis of component is essential to a counterfeit mitigation strategy

NSN: 5962-XX-XXX-XXXX

Nomenclature: Microcircuit, Linear

Cost: ~\$100

This one NSN supports 158 Weapon Systems with a Weapons System Essentiality Code of one, which if fails, renders system inoperable

Weapon System		
MISSILE, MINUTEMAN III, LGM-30	Х	
STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS (POSEIDON AND TRIDENT)	x	
AIRCRAFT, STRATOFORTRESS B-52	X	
AIRCRAFT, HERCULES C-130	X	
ASSAULT BREACHER VE	X	
NUCLEAR REACTORS PROGRAM	X	
AN/SQQ-32 MINE HUNTING SONAR SET	x	
OHIO CLASS SSBN (TRIDENT)	Χ	
MISSILE, AIR LAUNCH CRUISE (ALCM) AGM-86B	X	
RADAR SYSTEMS, PHASE ARRAY FPS-85	X	
HELICOPTER, SEA KNIGHT H-46	Χ	
LIGHT ARMORED VEHIC (TAMCN: E09507B)	x	
SEAWOLF CLASS SSN	Χ	
AH-64-D LONGBOW	X	
TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN (M1A1)	X	
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD)	X	



Operational Evaluation

- Review of DLA's existing processes for adequacy to address the threat of counterfeits
- Multi-faceted approach
 - Training for awareness
 - Testing high risk commodities
 - Traceability to establish pedigree
 - Technology to take advantage of advances in anticounterfeiting

Evolving from detection to prevention



R&D Phase 1: Demonstration & Results

- Created custom SigNature® DNA mark for one manufacturer
- Marked for 2+ months at manufacturer's prototype facility (CONUS)
 - Marked parts with plant-based DNA-inoculated ink
 - No change to production process
 - Read quick-detect marks without difficulty
 - DNA forensic testing proved authenticity
 - 100% true positives
 - 100% true negatives (swabs from unmarked parts)
 - Included test at distributor's facility

Validation of technical feasibility



R&D Phase 2: DNA Marking Expanded Testing

- Expanded test of technology
 - Marking at offshore large scale fabrication facility
 - Marking at emulation manufacturer
 - Adding downstream users: distributors, OEMs, DoD
- Independent vulnerability assessment, "Red Team"
 - Assess maturity of SigNature® DNA technology
 - Attempt to defeat the technology
 - Review alternative marking technologies



Independent Assessment of DNA Technology

- Battelle Labs performed assessment
 - Attempted to "defeat" the technology
 - Transfer of marking technology onto previously unmarked items
 - Perform DNA sequencing of extracted marking to uncover & replicate hidden "keys"
 - Zero successes in over 400 attempts
 - Assess maturity of SigNature® DNA technology
 - Literature search and data review are positive



Original Implementation Plan

- Contact academic, commercial, and government activities and industry associations to facilitate parallel implementation paths
 - Promote voluntary industry adoption
 - OCMs, OEMs, distributors
 - Encourage industry association best practice
 - Develop voluntary industry standard for marking to assure authenticity – SigNature® DNA as one alternative
 - Working on industry "authentication" standard with SAE (G19)



DLA Implementation of DNA Marking

- Applies to 5962 class items microcircuits
- July 2012, 18-month R&D effort completed
- August 2012, DNA mark requirement for all "emulated" microcircuits
- November 2012, DNA marking requirement for all new microcircuit solicitations
- December 2012, decision to reimburse the cost of DNA marking material
- January 2013, procurements limited to trusted sources with DNA marking



Future Procurements of FSC 5962 Trusted Sources

- Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM)
- Original Component Manufacturers (OCM)
- Qualified Manufacturers under QML
- Authorized Distributors
- Qualified Suppliers of QPL Products
- Qualified Suppliers List for Distributors (QSLD) with trace
- Qualified Testing Suppliers List (QTSL)
- SRI Generalized Emulation of Microcircuits (GEM)



Current Status

- Developed contractual language for use in all solicitations
 & contracts for FSC 5962
- Issued instructions to DLA workforce
 - Procurement
 - Reimbursement of marking costs
 - Inspection & acceptance
 - Inventory & returns
- Making awards to trusted sources with DNA mark
- Following up on logistical & legal issues



Assessment of Supply Class Risk

- DLA manages 4.3 million items, assigned to 548 supply classes
- Supply classes evaluated for counterfeit vulnerabilities
- Electrical & Electronic Components ranked 1 of top 5 five commodities most vulnerable to counterfeits

Electrical and Electronic Components

Engine Accessories

(2)

Pipes and Fittings

(3)

Hardware and Abrasives

(4)

Vehicle Components

(5)

2012 NDAA, Section 818 "Detection and Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic Parts"

- Prohibits contractors from charging DOD cost of counterfeit parts
- Requires contractors that supply electrical parts to establish policies & procedures to eliminate counterfeits from entering DOD's supply chains
- Requires DOD to adopt policies & procedures for detecting & avoiding counterfeit parts
- Authorizes suspension & debarment of contractors who repeatedly fail to detect & avoid counterfeit parts, or otherwise fail to exercise due diligence in detection & avoidance of counterfeit parts



Combating Counterfeiting Strategy "Defense in Depth"

- Training--implemented DLA counterfeit awareness training
- Testing--increased testing for items at risk for counterfeiting
- Traceability--requiring item traceability back to original manufacturer
- Trusted Sources--buying from trusted sources
- Technology--using anti-counterfeiting technology, such as DNA marking
- Threat Assessments--utilizing all-source supply chain threat assessments to inform risk management strategies
- Information Systems--developing decision support capability IT system to identify high risk suppliers--prior to contract award



Cost Reimbursement

- Paid on award of delivery order or purchase order
- Marking costs covered include:
 - Unique DNA mark
 - DNA ink
 - Authentication program
 - Monthly reports
 - Training
 - Detector set