With the release of DFARS 252.246.7008, supplier qualification requirements remain front and center in the US Government’s efforts to prevent counterfeit parts from entering the military supply chain. Of importance, not only to government contractors, is the topic of supplier assessment as a key element in every organization’s documented mitigation program/control plan.
The aerospace standards AS9100, AS9110 and AS9120 aim to establish minimum baselines for quality management systems for manufacturers, repair stations and stockist distributors, respectively. Companies are then audited against those standards in order to achieve “certification” by an accredited third party registrar; this certification can open access to contracts available from government agencies, OEMs and aerospace primes.
At ERAI, we are constantly evolving and finding ways to better
serve our Members. We have expanded the data that is presented to you in our
High Risk and Suspect Counterfeit Parts Database. Along with the standard
report categories and nonconformance description, Members can now see the
components’ type and a new section cross referencing alerts issued for similar
Since 2001 ERAI has been collecting and storing data on nonconforming and suspect counterfeit parts. This searchable high risk and suspect counterfeit database includes nonconformance descriptions and images, if available. Each reported part is assigned one of the following “ERAI Part Alert Classifications”:
In the last few years there has been a flurry of legislative activity relative to counterfeit electronic parts in the DoD supply chain. In 2007 concerns were raised by the U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) who asked the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) Office of Technology Evaluation (OTE) to conduct a defense industrial base assessment of counterfeit electronics. NAVAIR had reason to suspect an increasing number of counterfeit and defective electronics were entering the DoD supply chain, which would adversely impact weapon system reliability. NAVAIR’s suspicions were confirmed. The BIS study titled “Defense Industrial Base Assessment: Counterfeit Electronics” was published in January 2010. The report’s findings prompted a swift response from Senators Carl Levin and John McCain in March 2011 when they launched a deeper investigation into counterfeit electronics part activity via the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC). In November 2011, the SASC held a hearing with DoD contractors, industry associations and others in Washington D.C. to explore the problem of counterfeit electronic parts infiltrating critical defense systems and the risk those parts pose to such systems.